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 Introduction 
 
 Suburban expansion has continued largely unabated across the United States over the last 
50 years in part because of the lack of available and relatively inexpensive properties in infill 
locations closer to the core of metropolitan areas.  Often, for example, homebuilders seek large 
acreages of farmland on the outskirts of urban areas in order to deliver large numbers of homes 
quickly and efficiently to the market.  Developers who would like to carry out projects on infill 
parcels often complain of problems with land assemblage, high land prices, and entitlement 
delays. 
 Over the last several years, however, several disparate forces have created opportunities 
for significant, large scale infill projects in various locations around the country.  As the 
Pentagon continued to consolidate and streamline operations domestically as a result of the end 
of the Cold War, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (“BRAC”) targeted dozens of 
military installations, many in or near large urban areas, for closure and conversion to civilian 
real estate uses.  For example, during the 1990s the Defense Department closed the famous 
Presidio complex in San Francisco, and over the last few years developers have worked with 
local governments to create a mixed-use recreational, residential, and office complex, including 
the new headquarters of Lucasfilms (Fost).  In Denver, the closure of Lowry Air Force Base in 
1991 spurred an infill development of residential and commercial properties within five miles of 
Downtown Denver.   
 During the last ten years, the diminishing influence of manufacturing in local economies 
in the U.S., coupled with increased demand for urban residential options such as lofts and 
condos, has spurred a significant market for redevelopment of “brownfield” and related 
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 industrial properties in urban areas nationwide.  For example, officials in San Diego have 
converted an aging industrial area into the Padres’ Petco Park baseball stadium and nearby 
residential and commercial developments.  Atlanta officials have converted the 138 acre former 
home of Atlantic Steel north of downtown into Atlantic Station, a mixed use development 
including over 12 million square feet (“SF”) of retail, office, and residential space. 
 A few cities have converted or are considering converting older airport facilities in the 
heart of their urban areas to other uses as a result of new airport construction elsewhere.  The 
City of Austin, Texas, has been working on plans for reuse of the Robert Mueller Municipal 
Airport as a mixed-use urban village for several years.  The City of San Diego is considering 
relocating its current airport away from the increasingly revitalized downtown area and using the 
existing airport parcel to augment its central city redevelopment efforts. 
 As cities, and private developers, continue to pursue and execute large scale infill 
developments, whether on brownfields, former military or airport facilities, or on relatively clean 
raw ground, the experience of Denver, Colorado in redeveloping the former Stapleton 
International Airport should prove instructive.  This effort, which began following the movement 
of the city’s airport operations to the new Denver International Airport on the Eastern Plains 
about twenty miles from Downtown Denver in 1995, continues to evolve.  However, planning 
for the $4 billion Stapleton effort began over 15 years ago, and Denver’s experience provides 
several lessons for large scale infill projects.  This paper will examine the progress of the 
Stapleton development to date, including its successes and areas for improvement.  How did 
Denver plan for the redevelopment of the airport site?  How was the development program for 
Stapleton structured, and how was the private sector brought into the picture?  What kinds of 
incentives and financing arrangements did the city utilize to launch the development process?  
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 How have the retail, residential, and office components of the Stapleton project fared in the 
marketplace, and what lessons from the venture’s performance in each of these sectors can 
developers of other infill projects use?  In general, what have development professionals at 
Forest City, the project’s master developer, learned from Stapleton that can apply to subsequent 
infill ventures?  The paper will conclude with a set of general recommendations for future infill 
development projects, and in particular for larger scale projects such as base, airport, or 
brownfield conversions. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 For several decades following the Love Canal environmental remediation disaster in New 
York state during the 1970s, developers almost entirely passed over idle brownfield or vacant 
infill properties in and around cities in favor of greenfield properties.  Completing projects in 
environmentally contaminated or rundown areas was deemed too risky by the capital markets, 
and as a potential project management nightmare by developers themselves. 
 Over the last decade, however, redevelopment of infill parcels has rapidly accelerated as 
larger developers gain more knowledge and a track record of completing infill projects around 
the country.  There are an estimated 450,000 brownfield sites around the country (Bisacquino), 
and the recent movement toward remediation and reuse started with an effort by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to spur safe redevelopment of brownfields in 1995 
through technical advice and funding (Max).  The 2002 XL Environmental Land Use Report, 
issued by XL Environmental and the International Economic Development Council, found a 43 
percent increase in brownfield land use activities over the years 2000 and 2001 (Squyres).  
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 Today, there is greater confidence in the redevelopment process and in remediation processes 
and technologies.  Concerns regarding sprawl have prompted cities to focus development efforts 
in brownfield and infill areas, as municipalities continue to cope with higher infrastructure costs 
and diminished open space as a result of highly dispersed development patterns on the urban 
fringe.  In addition, cities also view brownfield and infill development as significant potential 
employment generators.  According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors Recycling America’s 
Land Report, 187 cities estimate that over 55,000 jobs could be created on former brownfield 
sites (ibid).  Passage of the 2002 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization 
Act, in particular, has stimulated brownfield redevelopment activity.  Under this act, developers 
are protected from liability expenses associated with environmental remediation and can use tax 
incentives and grants from all levels of government to make brownfield efforts financially 
feasible.  The EPA has continued to grant millions of dollars in funds to promote brownfield 
reuse (Bisacquino).   
 Because the Stapleton Airport site contained numerous environmental hazards, such as jet 
fuel and other chemicals remaining as a result of airport operations, the project represents not 
only one of the largest infill projects in the country, but one of the largest brownfield case studies 
as well.  Although brownfield efforts have had to overcome hurdles in terms of mitigating the 
environmental and legal risks of remediation efforts, reuse of these sites tends to carry less 
political baggage than traditional redevelopment or “urban renewal” initiatives of the post-war 
era.  Fostering redevelopment of these sites usually does not involve controversial eminent 
domain or relocation initiatives, as is often the case when developers wish to carry out infill 
efforts in existing neighborhoods.  Because the average brownfield site nationwide includes 41 
acres, these reuse efforts usually do not involve time-consuming and difficult movements to 
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 assemble parcels (Fulton).  Properties such as Stapleton represent highly unique opportunities:  
large acreages of land in the center of metropolitan areas, obtained without controversial land 
assembly methods. 
 While the reuse of older industrial areas in central cities has garnered a great deal of 
media attention with regards to brownfields redevelopment, the conversion of airports also 
represents an example of the emerging prominence of brownfield redevelopment around the 
country.  The Stapleton effort has benefited greatly from efforts at all levels of government, as 
well as interest from developers and other parties in the private sector, in reusing brownfield sites 
in order to create economic activity and development on infill locations. 
 
Research Methods 
 
 This project utilizes primarily qualitative analysis of the redevelopment process at 
Stapleton, spanning the entire project from initial planning through current performance of the 
venture in the Denver real estate marketplace.  The Stapleton redevelopment represents a good 
case study for infill projects because it is currently the largest infill effort in the United States 
and has garnered significant headlines in the development community.  In addition, the author 
lived in Denver during the summer of 2005 and visited the Stapleton area on several occasions, 
and this familiarity aided the research efforts.  In addition, although many years of development 
remain at the Stapleton site, most of the primary retail components of the venture, as well as 
some of its residential components, are already substantially in place.  In less than five years, 
Stapleton has already established a track record of performance than can provide lessons to the 
planning and real estate development community. 
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  Research began with general, background Internet research concerning Stapleton, 
including articles in newspapers, business journals, real estate publications, and related sources.  
This included an examination of Stapleton information displayed on the websites of the Forest 
City Corporation and the City and County of Denver, and marketing materials from Stapleton.  
The Green Book, the primary planning document for Stapleton published during the 1990s, 
provided invaluable information concerning the initial efforts at the grassroots and governmental 
levels to launch the Stapleton project.  Following this secondary research effort, the focus of 
research shifted to discussions with officials from Forest City Denver and other stakeholder 
organizations, first by email and then by telephone, to gain additional knowledge and insight 
concerning the project.  Phone interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes each and provided 
very valuable information for this project.  Interview participants freely shared knowledge 
concerning Stapleton, and this primary research provided valuable material necessary to make 
the recommendations outlined at the conclusion of this report. 
 The research process remained objective in nature.  The report summarizes the history of 
the Stapleton effort and its progress to date.  This paper focuses mainly on the planning process 
and the real estate development strategies employed by Forest City in carrying out the project.  
Although it briefly mentions certain design elements impacting the project, this document does 
not substantially analyze the Stapleton venture from an urban design standpoint. 
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 Stapleton Location and History 
 
 The site of the former Stapleton International Airport enjoys an enviable location, 
strategically located between Downtown Denver and the new Denver International Airport, 
about 20 miles northeast of downtown.  The Stapleton development is about five miles east of 
downtown near the junction of Interstates 70 and 270 and Quebec Street.  City leaders dedicated 
the area as Denver Municipal Airport in 1929, and at the time ranches and farms on the city’s 
fringe surrounded the facility.  The airport grew from 345 acres to around 4,700 acres by the 
1980s, and the arrival of commercial jet transportation, coupled with the growth of Denver and 
the Colorado region following World War II, made Stapleton International Airport the primary 
air facility serving the Rocky Mountain region.  The completion of Interstate 70 nearby helped 
spur suburban growth on the east side of the metropolitan area, and today Stapleton has a very 
central location in metro Denver, which now stretches dozens of miles from the Rocky Mountain 
foothills west of Morrison to the Eastern Plains of Aurora.  The outer freeway and tollway loop 
around the east side of Denver, C-470, and anticipated commercial and residential growth near 
DIA make Stapleton’s close-in location within a ten minute drive of Downtown even more 
attractive. 
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  As Denver grew around Stapleton between 1950 and 1980, several factors led the 
community to consider an alternate location for an expanded new international airport.  
Residents of surrounding residential neighborhoods, including Park Hill, brought suit against the 
city for noise created by the airport and lobbied against expansions of runways.  Due to 
inadequate spacing between runways, traffic at the airport notoriously backed up during 
Denver’s snow events.  Adams County threatened to block expansion of Stapleton to the north 
into the open space of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal area.  By 1985, the City of Denver and 
Adams County reached agreement to relocate airport operations to a new site northeast of the 
city.  By 1989, voters in both jurisdictions approved plans for Denver to annex over 35,000 acres 
in rural Adams County for construction of a new international airport. 
 
Evolution of Stapleton, 1989-2000 
 
Initial Planning Efforts 
 Following the vote, initial planning efforts for the Stapleton property began.  Stapleton 
Tomorrow, a group of 35 citizens from across the city, formed in 1989 to conduct planning for 
the property and solicited input from a broad spectrum of the Denver community.  By 1991, the 
group completed a concept plan for Stapleton that the City Council adopted as an amendment to 
Denver’s Comprehensive Plan.  The primary issues addressed in this initial Stapleton plan 
included economic development and job creation opportunities, open space and recreation, and 
cultural opportunities.   
 In the next step of the planning process, the City of Denver entered into a partnership 
with the Stapleton Redevelopment Foundation (“SRF”) in 1993, whereby SRF took 
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 responsibility for the management and creation of a more detailed development plan and a 
physical and financial development plan for the Stapleton property.  The SRF also aimed to 
define a long-term management structure for the Stapleton redevelopment and identify the first 
phases of development at the site.  Mayor Wellington Webb appointed a Citizens Advisory 
Board (“CAB”) to oversee the redevelopment process in 1993 and include extensive community 
input in the planning efforts.  The SRF and the City assembled a team comprised of a full 
spectrum of development professionals and consultants from various fields to conduct detailed 
analyses as part of the Development Plan.  The professionals studied various options for 
Stapleton in terms of site planning requirements, and technical and economic feasibility.  
Importantly, the planning efforts during this stage involved more than 100 community 
presentations and meetings and various public workshops and hearings in an effort to fully 
incorporate the viewpoints of a wide spectrum of the Denver community.  The strong 
commitment to community involvement helped craft a development plan that more fully 
reflected Denver’s long-term goals for the Stapleton area. 
 The efforts of the SRF and the CAB culminated in the publication of the Stapleton 
Development Plan, which has become known as the “Green Book”, in 1995.  The document has 
continued to guide development of Stapleton to this day. 
 
Bringing the Green Book Ideas to Life 
 Following the publishing of the Green Book, the city moved to create structures and 
processes to bring the redevelopment of Stapleton to fruition.  In 1995, the same year Stapleton 
airport closed and operations moved to DIA, the city created the Stapleton Development 
Corporation (“SDC”).  The goals of the SDC were to work with the city to sign a Master Lease 
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 and Disposition Agreement, which would provide SDC a legal mechanism to take title to the 
property and sell it to third-parties for development.   
 This stage of the Stapleton planning process slowed considerably, as officials worked to 
translate the relatively broad goals and ideals of the Green Book and previous planning efforts 
into concrete development standards and formal agreements.  The effort appeared to languish by 
the end of 1997.  The initial crisis Denver encountered was in defining the roles of the SDC.  The 
city created the SDC to operate as an independent authority over the Stapleton effort.  However, 
the city continued to control authority over all general fund expenditures with regards to 
Stapleton, and the airport authority continued to exercise control over the parcel as well.  The 
SDC initially saw itself as the master developer of Stapleton.  However, the entity controlled 
zero capital for development and lacked experience in executing real estate developments.  In 
contrast, Denver International Airport and the airlines believed the city should just sell the entire 
parcel to a third-party developer quickly, and largely remove itself from the Stapleton process.  
Mayor Webb, meanwhile, insisted that no general fund revenues be spent on the Stapleton 
redevelopment (Anderson).    
 By the end of 1997, embattled SDC director Andy Barnes left the organization, and many 
in Denver’s business community believed the Stapleton effort was languishing.  The city itself 
believed that the SDC suffered from a bloated, bureaucratic operating style, and as a result began 
selling off parcels on the edge of the airport property to third-party developers, including the 
King Soopers supermarket chain (Dempsey).  In a scathing op-ed piece in the Denver Business 
Journal, law professor Paul Stephen Dempsey of the University of Denver, who authored a book 
concerning the construction of DIA, indicated that nine of DIA’s airlines had filed complaints 
with the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) concerning the operations at Stapleton.  
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 Revenues from the redevelopment of Stapleton, and limited revenues from ongoing leases at the 
old airport, were intended to retire debt associated with DIA’s construction (Dempsey).  During 
1997, the SDC spent more than $9 million on its redevelopment efforts, and took in about $2 
million from ongoing leases at the airport, leaving a deficit of over $7 million.  The airlines 
believed the delays in redeveloping Stapleton essentially translated into higher gate fees and a 
more precarious financial position for them at DIA.   
 At the beginning of 1998 SDC faced several issues, including: 1) resolving who would 
pay for environmental cleanup of the airport property; 2) deciding who would guarantee the 
demolition of several airport properties; 3) putting zoning and master design guidelines in place; 
4) Officially designating public rights of way and open space areas; 5) submitting master 
covenants on properties to the city; 6) ensuring that Stapleton’s infrastructure plan was accepted; 
and 7) legally identifying saleable land parcels at the site (Moore (1)).  The airlines and SDC 
continued to argue during 1997 over costs for environmental remediation at Stapleton, with the 
parties haggling over $40 to $60 million in “unattributable” costs pertaining to asbestos removal 
and cleaning up oil spills not caused by the airlines (ibid).  
 In 1998, the city replaced Andy Barnes with Dick Anderson, a veteran Denver 
businessman who had developed several business parks in the area and had successfully 
managed one of the largest employment centers in metro Denver, the Denver Tech Center in the 
southern suburbs.  Mr. Anderson indicated that one of the main challenges the effort faced 
involved defining the standards for cleaning and remediation of the property.  This negotiation 
process, and the navigation of various bureaucratic channels, delayed the project by at least 
eighteen months (Anderson).  Anderson notes that each party in the negotiation wanted a larger 
share of management and control in the development process than initially anticipated. 
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  While the SDC, the city, and other players continued to negotiate during the mid to late 
1990s, the project continued to attract significant interest from private developers who coveted 
the airport’s enviable location in metro Denver.  A local attorney offered $30 million for the 
entire 4,700 Stapleton parcel (or about $6,400 per acre).  Several large, national industrial 
developers also expressed interest in the project, including San Francisco-based Catellus, 
Atlanta-based Industrial Developments International, Inc., and Majestic Realty, one of 
California’s largest industrial developers.  City officials at the time cautioned against simply 
selling the parcel quickly to a private developer.  They indicated that a huge project like 
Stapleton would still face the same entitlement issues as before, and worried that some private 
developers would not have the wherewithal to deliver significant infrastructure components, 
including roads, sewers, and other utilities.  Jennifer Moulton, Denver Planning Director, 
stressed in 1997 that “selling Stapleton to a private developer does not get the government out” 
(Moore (2)).  Private developers countered that the Stapleton effort was missing valuable 
opportunities to create value in the Denver real estate marketplace, and that quickly selling the 
parcel to private interests would remove politics and bureaucratic personalities from the mix. 
 Under Dick Anderson’s new leadership at the SDC, the organization moved more quickly 
in providing mechanisms to sell Stapleton land to a third-party developer while continuing to 
adhere to the planning principles outlined in the Green Book.  Anderson indicates that the SDC 
fielded over 100 inquiries from private developers for the Stapleton project, but that in the end 
the selection process was not overly technical.  A selection committee narrowed the field to four 
or five finalists, and conducted serious interviews of each developer.  The SDC carefully 
researched developers to ensure that they would follow the tenets and general development plan 
described in the Green Book.  However, in contrast to the SDC’s prior efforts, the group moved 
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 quickly, and took only nine weeks from the start of the interviews to select Stapleton’s 
developer, Forest City Enterprises of Cleveland, Ohio (Knox). 
 
Closing the Deal with Forest City 
 The SDC’s development agreement with Forest City was a catalyst for moving the 
Stapleton effort forward, and has provided the basis for much of the development’s success over 
the last several years.  The deal essentially removed the SDC from its role as an actual developer 
of the property, leaving this responsibility to Forest City.  The SDC did retain general 
responsibility overseeing the development of greenspace in the Stapleton area.  The SDC 
selected Forest City as Stapleton’s developer in November 1998, and the company finalized its 
purchase agreement and development agreement in February 2000.   
 Under the agreement, Forest City was responsible for purchasing nearly 3,000 
developable acres at the Stapleton site over a 15 year period, with a minimum purchase of 1,000 
acres every five years.  The company was required to acquire its first 200 acres during the year 
2000.  This arrangement equals a total of $79.4 million for the Forest City acreage, a total 
calculated based upon an independent appraisal in December 1999.  In addition to the purchase 
price, Forest City was required to provide $15,000 per acre, or a total of $44 million, as a System 
Development Fee to be used by the Stapleton Metropolitan District for the development of over 
1,100 acres of regional parks and open space at the former airport (Yoko). 
 In addition to the $44 million in System Development Fees paid by Forest City, the SDC 
planned to utilize tax increment financing (“TIF”) financing for the remainder of the regional 
park program at Stapleton.  Upon completion of these amenities, the SDC was to transfer the 
park and open space properties to the City and County of Denver’s Park Department. 
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  Importantly, the city required Forest City to follow the Stapleton Development Plan 
completed several years prior to the agreement.  The document mandated that the developer 
follow a set of development performance standards and community involvement benchmarks as 
well.  These stipulations ensured that the efforts of the community planning process of the early 
1990s would produce tangible results at Stapleton, and that the Denver community would 
continue to have a significant voice in how the former airport would develop.  In addition, a 
development agreement lacking such provisions may not have met with city approval given the 
political force of nearby residents and the overall political environment in Denver. 
 In return for Forest City’s agreement to the aforementioned provisions of the 
development agreement, the City and County of Denver agreed to deliver environmentally clean 
parcels to the developer and to complete demolition of necessary structures and the old airport 
runway on site.  Importantly, the city agreed to provide a TIF arrangement to fund public 
infrastructure improvements at Stapleton.  Under the terms of this deal, Forest City assumed 
project management responsibility to construct infrastructure such as streets and sewers at the 
site.  The city of Denver, through the Denver Urban Renewal Authority (“DURA”) formed a tax 
increment finance district for the Stapleton property, with Forest City assuming responsibility 
and risk for infrastructure improvements.  DURA’s responsibility was to reimburse Forest City 
for infrastructure costs by issuing bonds against the incremental increase in property and sales 
taxes generated by the redevelopment project.  The city projected in 2000 that about half of the 
$674 million in infrastructure costs would be financed through TIF bonds, with the remainder 
reimbursed to Forest City through increased property and sales tax revenue (The American 
Banker).  However, in an effort to ensure that the city earn a return on its investment in later 
years as the development progresses, the agreement stipulated that the city’s share of the 
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 incremental increase in property and sales taxes, to be retained in city coffers, increase over a 25 
year period, rising to 47 percent during the 2020-2024 time frame.  This represents a unique 
model in that the Stapleton TIF project is expected to return a greater proportion of revenues to 
the local government in an effort to recoup the city for increased expenditures for police, fire, 
and other services provided for the development’s new residents and businesses (Robinson et. 
al).  Often, TIF arrangements provide for a consistent level of reimbursement to city coffers over 
the life of a project, with the upside in revenues over time going to the developer.  Denver’s TIF 
arrangement for Stapleton helped provide necessary infrastructure for the project, but allowed 
the general public and taxpayers to earn a better return from the investment over time. 
 The enormous size and complexity of the Stapleton deal produced the delay of about 16 
months between Forest City’s selection in late 1998 and the finalization of agreements with the 
city in early 2000.  Forest City anticipated closing on the deal by July 1999, but complications in 
completing appraisals required by the FAA delayed the process.  In general, the sheer size of the 
deal magnified the normal difficulties and challenges encountered in completing due diligence, 
including land surveys, environmental surveys, and title-transfer mechanics.  SDC spokesman 
Tom Gleason emphasized at the time that “there really is no comparable project anywhere in the 
United States…There’s no guidebook for this sort of thing.  We’re breaking new ground.”  
(Moore (3))  Items that particularly caused delays included negotiating the TIF structure and 
establishing the associated metropolitan benefit district associated with the financing structure, as 
well as negotiations concerning clean-up costs for the environmental hazards at the airport, 
including contamination from jet fuel and solvents.  Forest City’s agreement with the SDC 
actually included 24 sub-agreements, meaning that any substantive change to one part of the 
contract necessitated multiple changes elsewhere in the agreement package.  Officials indicated 
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 that, in general, the very long-term nature of the contract with Forest City and the development 
period created many uncertainties that created headaches.  All parties realized that assumptions 
made at the time would change over the next several decades of the relationship.  Tom Markham, 
head of the nearby Lowry Redevelopment Authority in Denver, which is completing the much 
smaller project involving reuse of the Lowry Air Force Base, noted that “there’s just no cookie-
cutter for developing a closed airport.”  (Moore (4)) 
 
Forest City Moves Forward 
 
Forest City Assembles Leadership Team 
 As the due diligence process continued during 1999, Forest City worked to assemble its 
leadership team and begin crafting its development strategy for Stapleton.  Hank Baker, who had 
led the development of the famous 100,000-acre Irvine Ranch master-planned community in 
Orange County, California, brought his experience to Forest City Stapleton as vice chairman of 
marketing.  Jim Chrisman, who had worked with the SRF in crafting the Green Book during the 
1990s and served as the head of development for the SDC, joined as vice president of 
development.  Chrisman’s appointment helped Forest City carry out the community’s vision for 
the property as detailed in the Green Book.  Forest City worked to create bonds with local 
community efforts with the appointment of Landri Taylor, who had worked on Mayor Webb’s 
staff, as vice president of community affairs, and John Lehigh, who had been involved in 
bringing Coors Field to Lower Downtown Denver (“Lo Do”), as executive vice president of 
Forest City Stapleton (Narvaes). 
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 Launching the Project: Retail at Stapleton 
 Following completion of the purchase agreement with the city, Forest City began 
launching its development plan for the former airport.  Through demographic and market 
research, company officials very quickly determined that the northeastern parts of metro Denver 
were underserved from a retail standpoint.  The neighborhoods surrounding Stapleton contained 
a larger percentage of lower income and minority populations that desired traditional shopping 
options for basic goods, including those provided by supermarkets and big-box retailers, but 
often had to drive to the eastern suburbs in Aurora or to the south along I-25 in Denver to shop.  
In addition, the Stapleton site enjoyed tremendous access to Interstates 70 and 270 and would 
therefore likely reap additional retail spending from other parts of the metropolitan area.  Most 
importantly, retail development promised a tremendous and rapid increase in commercial 
property tax valuations at the site and significant sales tax revenues.  The incremental increase in 
the property and sales tax revenue, of course, could be used to finance and advance infrastructure 
improvements in other areas of Stapleton. 
 As a result, Forest City launched its efforts at Stapleton in early 2001 with the 
construction of Quebec Square, a 740,000 SF commercial area on 75 acres along Quebec Street, 
less than a mile south of the I-70 interchange.  This effort was part of the company’s initial 
purchase of 272 acres at the airport in Spring 2001, including 172 acres for homes and 
apartments and 25 acres for a neighborhood town center.  Signed anchor tenants for Quebec 
Square included Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club, and Home Depot (Forest City (1)).  As reflected in the 
project’s site map (Appendix D), Quebec Square largely resembles typical “power center” retail 
shopping areas found throughout suburban areas of the country.  The anchor tenants enjoy ample 
parking areas in front of their stores, and numerous “pad” retail spaces line the development 
along the primary arterial, Quebec Street.  At the request of city officials, Forest City did modify 
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 the site plan for the area in order to lay out the retail buildings on a formal grid pattern, as 
reflected in the neighborhood streets of 35th and 36th Avenues and Rosemary Street.  Company 
officials indicate that the grid pattern will allow planners to modify the retail acreage to other 
uses, perhaps including more town center-oriented retail arrangements in a more intimate 
pedestrian setting, in the future.  Although such a scenario is likely at least a few decades away 
depending on retail market dynamics, the existing grid pattern may allow Forest City or a 
subsequent developer to modify Quebec Square to a more “New Urbanist” or higher density 
project without having to revamp the entire street layout and infrastructure system.  Forest City’s 
plan therefore may allow for greater adaptability in coming years at lower costs (Baker).  In 
addition to establishing public streets on a grid pattern within Quebec Square, the company 
installed detached sidewalks throughout the development in order to create a greater “Main 
Street” feel in the area and encourage and support pedestrian activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Street Level View of Quebec Square (courtesy Stapleton Denver web site) 
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Aerial View of Quebec Square (courtesy Stapleton Denver web site) 
 
 The development plan for Quebec Square invited considerable criticism from some local 
leaders as well as advocates of “New Urbanism”, higher density infill development, and other 
planning ideas that had been part of the foundation of the Stapleton redevelopment effort over 
the past decade.  Some local leaders indicated that Quebec Square merely represented a cookie-
cutter, suburban-style shopping center in the heart of the city.  New Urbanists criticized the 
layout of the retail area, which featured huge parking areas, lower density, and less connectivity 
between uses than initial plans for Stapleton.  The Green Book envisioned the neighborhood 
southeast of I-70 and Quebec, including the Quebec Square acreage, developing as a high 
density, mixed-use employment, residential, and commercial area.  It also planned for 
development to tie in with planned transit stops and intermodal transit connections at the 
location.  While concrete plans for light rail along the northern edge of Quebec Square did not 
exist by 2001, critics believed that the development overly relied on auto transportation and 
generous parking allotments.  In general, some observers in planning circles believed that Forest 
City had taken the easy road out and planned an uninspiring beginning to its retail efforts at 
Stapleton. 
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  Forest City officials have contended that market forces and the need to generate funding 
for subsequent development of the airport site necessitated the retail development plan for 
Quebec Square.  Jim Chrisman, who had participated in the Green Book effort, emphasized that 
pure market forces and the demographics of northeast Denver drove the company’s decision to 
pursue big-box retailers (Chrisman).  National retailers of all stripes simply look at population 
and retail market data and choose locations based on this hard data.  The underserved nature of 
the retail market in the area was too striking to avoid pursuing the big-box merchants.  Mr. 
Chrisman also indicated that the success of the Quebec Square venture absolutely relied on 
attracting national retailers, and that despite the attractiveness of the location Forest City had to 
compete with other potential sites in metro Denver.  He noted that the power Wal-Mart and 
similar national retailers have over site plans, including parking and building layouts, increases 
with the number of alternative retail locations in a given area.  Furthermore, as is common 
knowledge in the commercial real estate world, the ability to attract anchor tenants drives the 
ability to attract subsequent credit-quality tenants for smaller building footprints and pad sites.  
Developers often must sign a large tenant such as a Wal-Mart or Target in order to attract other 
strong, highly popular tenants such as Chili’s, Qdoba, Linens n’ Things, and other familiar 
national chains.   
 Anchor tenants tend to be fairly demanding in their expectations of developers in terms of 
site plans, rents, and other terms because their presence drives further development.  Smaller 
retailers sometimes balk at mixed-use or “lifestyle” center arrangements featuring parking along 
the rear of buildings and placement of the fronts of anchor tenants along main streets, in order to 
create a more “connected” retail environment.  Many smaller retailers often strongly desire pad 
sites situated in a sea of parking because this placement increases their visibility to drivers and 
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 helps them derive traffic from shoppers traveling to the big-box anchors.  Some retailers also 
object to Main Street-oriented retail centers because these arrangements locate the main parking 
and loading areas in very close proximity along the back sides of buildings.  The presence of 
loading docks and dumpsters can create aesthetic problems and limit retail viability.  These site 
planning considerations partially influenced Forest City’s move to launch a relatively standard 
power center at Quebec Square.   
 In terms of parking, Chrisman indicated that the City of Denver was fairly flexible in its 
requirements of retail developments.  However, Wal-Mart insisted on the inclusion of five 
parking spaces per 1,000 SF of retail space, a ratio which is standard for suburban power centers, 
consumes considerable acreage, and often leaves a “sea of parking”, which many urban 
designers and critics of suburban growth find unattractive.   
 Most importantly, Forest City officials emphasized that the property and sales tax 
revenues generated by Quebec Square facilitated the funding of infrastructure of the more “New 
Urbanist” elements in subsequent stages of Stapleton’s growth.  Quebec Square now generates 
about $8 million in sales tax revenues annually (Montgomery).  The company also argues that 
the retail development has helped provide a significant number of jobs for Denver residents. 
 
Initial Residential Efforts at Stapleton 
 While Forest City’s retail team began development efforts for Quebec Square, the 
company launched the initial stages of its residential program at Stapleton as well.  The company 
followed the outlines of the Green Book plan for the airport fairly closely and, in general, the 
housing component followed a very tightly controlled program.  Company officials believed 
from the start that following a very integrated housing plan, in coordination with the 
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 development of retail, office, open space, and cultural amenities, would create greater long term 
value both for homeowners and for the development as a whole.  Denise Gammon, Forest City’s 
head of housing, indicates that she and her colleagues worked to integrate housing with the 
neighborhood town centers planned at Stapleton, public and cultural amenities, the open space 
and park program, and with the existing Denver neighborhoods surrounding the airport 
(Gammon).  Forest City worked to maintain the grid pattern of surrounding Denver streets and to 
extend them into Stapleton to create greater linkages.  In addition, in accordance with the Green 
Book, the company aimed to create a wide range of housing options for various income groups 
and to mix the various housing types as much as possible.  This stands in marked contrast to the 
practices of many suburban developers and homebuilders, who often arrange housing products to 
segregate by income and demographic profiles and, in classic Euclidian fashion, usually separate 
all housing from retail components. 
 Because Forest City aimed to create an usual and somewhat cutting edge infill 
development following the Green Book principles, the company approached the selection of 
homebuilders for various parcels and lots within Stapleton very carefully.  Gammon and her 
team spent over $100,000 on a design book for housing, which included detailed design 
standards and program specifications for the various residential products.  Ms. Gammon notes 
that Stapleton’s strategic location, within a 15 minute drive of Downtown Denver employment 
centers and a short drive to DIA, combined with the prospect of a significant pipeline of 
residential lots, enticed scores of builders.  In addition, the Denver residential market had 
exploded during the late 1990s as the area’s high-tech economy boomed, creating strong 
demand.  The LoDo area and other neighborhoods in Denver’s core continued to attract young 
professionals seeking urban amenities and shorter commutes, and the opening of a huge infill 
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 area in the city stimulated considerable homebuilder interest.  In addition, of course, low interest 
rates and more lenient and flexible lending terms were continuing to drive the macro-level 
residential market in Colorado and across the nation.  These market dynamics put Forest City in 
the driver’s seat in selecting partners for the residential component.  Gammon’s team envisioned 
an eventual build-out of Stapleton’s residential component over 15 years, but realized the 
disposition of residential lots and control of development standards at the front end was crucial 
for success.  It also believed that Stapleton’s sheer size and the complexities of the residential 
program meant that Forest City had to rethink the entire delivery process and the production line 
with regards to residential products, and that establishing strong partnerships with builders would 
dictate the project’s success. 
 Gammon’s residential team approached the selection of homebuilders very carefully.  
The company first conducted extensive market segmentation exercises for the various product 
types planned for Stapleton, including row homes, townhomes, and flats, as well as single-family 
homes.  Gammon and her associates segmented the market and envisioned each selected builder 
at Stapleton concentrating on a particular segment.  This arrangement provides a tradeoff to 
builders.  Each particular builder must adhere to strict design guidelines and oversight from 
Forest City, but in exchange each builder controls the market for a particular segment.  The 
market for row homes, for example, would become like a protected niche for a particular builder 
(Gammon).  Forest City began with an initial list of 100 interested homebuilders and quickly 
pared the roster of candidates to 25 firms that then submitted more detailed design proposals to 
the developer.  The short list of 25 included two to three candidates per segment, and each 
potential builder could only bid on the particular segment Forest City assigned to a given firm.  
The company arranged the solicitation process in this way to pair potential builders with their 
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 areas of expertise, and to find the right “fit” of builders in particular segments.  For example, 
Forest City did not assign KB Homes, a company which focuses on mass production of starter 
homes for the single-family market, to the luxury home segment.  From the group of 25 builders, 
Gammon chose builders for Stapleton by August 2001, and directed these firms to spend 
considerable time developing design proposals for homes at Stapleton.  The builders selected 
were McStain Builders, John Laing Homes, New Town Builders, Wonderland Homes, KB 
Home, and Trimark Communities (a division of DR Horton).  Gammon indicated that these 
seven builders “really embraced the Stapleton vision” (Johansen), and that some other national 
homebuilders that were not chosen balked at the strict control of development by Forest City and 
the stringent design guidelines. 
 An analysis of the seven chosen builders at Stapleton reveals that the firms brought 
particular strengths to the venture that complemented the development program and Forest City’s 
pitch to the market.  The Green Book and Forest City’s marketing packages emphasize the 
sustainable nature of the development, including significant open space dedications and inclusion 
of “green building” practices.  The company requires that all homes at Stapleton meet or exceed 
the standards of the “Built Green Colorado” program.  Louisville, Colorado-based McStain 
Builders, which has constructed single-family, carriage homes, and row home products at 
Stapleton, is a founding member of Built Green Colorado and one of the largest green builders 
on the Front Range (McStain).  The company also has experience in building at Lowry, the 
nearby infill project about a mile to the south.  For forty years, Lafayette, Colorado-based 
Wonderland Homes has developed a track record of delivering residential products employing 
higher design standards and neo-traditional architecture.  The company is currently constructing 
higher-density products in several neighborhoods around metro Denver, and the builder’s 
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 commitment to the Build Green Colorado program makes the company a natural fit for Stapleton 
(Wonderland).  New Town Builders, based in suburban Highlands Ranch, Colorado, has 
experience in developing New Urbanist communities along the Front Range, including Bradburn 
in Westminster and Coal Creek Village in Lafayette, and has constructed neo-traditional homes 
targeting various segments (New Town Builders).  Trimark (a division of DR Horton), KB 
Home, and John Laing Homes are national builders based outside of Colorado, but worked 
carefully with Forest City to develop products for the Stapleton effort.  In general, many of the 
national builders are now beginning to embrace infill development and creating building plans to 
fit these new market niches, especially in high-priced markets such as California.  The inclusion 
of builders familiar and experienced in green building, sustainable design, and infill communities 
dovetailed with Stapleton’s overall marketing strategy and likely helped drive premiums as the 
residential program unfolded.  The presence of several local builders with good reputations in the 
Denver market likely helped to enhance market acceptance of the Stapleton project in the 
metropolitan area. 
 Gammon indicates that enticing builders to pursue certain segments proved somewhat 
difficult.  By nature, homebuilders as a whole tend to move toward the “middle” range of the 
market, which often translates into mid-priced homes targeting traditional single-family buyers.  
Stapleton had to work over time to keep builders occupying segments away from the middle 
from modifying their products to cater more to the middle segment.  Allowing builders to 
muddle the distinctions between particular market segments might have resulted in oversaturated 
markets in certain segments and underserved markets for other segments.  The “Village Cottage” 
segment represented the core segment at Stapleton, and in fact was sufficiently large enough to 
warrant assignment of four homebuilders to this market niche.  Enticing builders to construct 
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 higher-end residential products at an unproven infill location proved more difficult.  The “edges” 
of the property, at the outskirts of the Stapleton property and located near older and more worn 
existing residential neighborhoods to the south and east, proved hard to populate as well.  As a 
result, Forest City worked from the start to “prime the pump” for residential development, by 
beginning with construction and sale of the perceived highly marketable Manor segment of 
homes.  The company began with construction of this segment, near the planned East 29th 
Avenue Town Center, a retail and mixed-use neighborhood shopping area near 29th and Quebec, 
in order to drive demand and subsequent interest in Stapleton, with the expectation that 
residential properties on the periphery of the property would then develop over time. 
 Forest City has been able to leverage Stapleton’s strategic infill location and the higher 
design standards it enforced in developing its residential program to drive impressive home sales 
over the first few years of operations.  Because the neighborhood was an unproven market, as 
opposed to well-established areas of central Denver, the company intentionally set initial home 
prices lower than competing areas in order to drive sales and create a “critical mass” of 
residential activity at the airport.  Existing homes in the Washington Park neighborhood sold for 
about $300 per SF the last few years, and homes in Park Hill for $250 per SF.  Both 
neighborhoods are considered to be among the “up and coming” residential neighborhoods in the 
urban core beginning to attract larger numbers of young professionals and small families.  
Stapleton initially set its residential prices at a considerably lower $200 per SF.  Over the last 
four to five years, as Stapleton has become a “hot” area for buyers looking for new product near 
Downtown, residential values at the airport have risen considerably.  Today, existing Stapleton 
homes sell on the resale market at about the same price per SF as competing, much older, and 
desirable neighborhoods to the west. 
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  Stapleton’s residential development has demonstrated an impressive absorption rate since 
the first residents moved in during the summer of 2002, and Forest City sees no limits to the 
current growth at the airport.  Initial marketing studies anticipated an absorption rate of 500 units 
per year, and the company’s business plan called for absorption of 600 units annually.  At the 
current time, however, Forest City is reporting an annual absorption of about 900 units annually, 
and projects absorption of between 800 and 900 residential units per year the next three to four 
years.  By comparison, Celebration, Florida, one of the most famous large scale New Urbanist 
projects in the country, averaged absorption of about 300 units annually.  Denise Gammon 
indicates that the company and its builders cannot deliver housing units to the market fast 
enough, and that if anything the company faces supply constraint problems because delivering 
homes rapidly can become a challenge (Gammon). 
 Although Stapleton has enjoyed tremendous residential absorption, Gammon indicates 
that the product mix and marketing strategy has changed somewhat over the last few years.  The 
original menu of residential products leaned more toward single-family offerings, while still 
providing a wide range of housing options.  Now, the project is moving toward providing more 
attached products.  Forest City has found that many of its buyers are choosing Stapleton for its 
urban lifestyle and central location, and many of these “lifestyle buyers” tend toward buying 
attached products such as row homes or townhomes.  Gammon indicates that the company must 
constantly revise its residential programs and housing offerings in order to keep the mix “fresh” 
with each new year.  Changing the product mix creates more marketing buzz and excitement and 
prevents the development from falling behind changes in product preferences and demographics.  
The company spends considerable time strategizing over where products are placed, and what 
products to offer.  Making a bad product call can greatly harm the development’s success.  In 
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 general, Forest City has tended to offer row homes and other attached products along major 
boulevards and roadways, and single family in the interior sections of neighborhoods.  The 
company has strived to maintain a broad range of housing, priced from the $100,000s to over $1 
million, and has dedicated part of the residential program to affordable housing. 
 Forest City believes that creating the Quebec Square retail development of primarily big-
box retailers helped it launch its residential component successfully.  Ms. Gammon indicates that 
the residential areas incurred very high overhead levels, including infrastructure costs that were 
nearly double that of a normal residential development in the metropolitan area.  The significant 
property and sales taxes generated at Quebec Square allowed the city to issue $150 million in 
bonds for infrastructure construction, including facilities serving residential components of 
Stapleton. 
 
Expanding Retail:  East 29th Avenue Town Center and Northfield at Stapleton 
 Following up on the success of the Quebec Town Square retail development and its 
impetus in helping launch infrastructure for Stapleton’s initial residential efforts, Forest City 
launched East 29th Avenue, the first of several planned “town center” or neighborhood retail 
centers serving the residential population in the development.  The project includes over 200,000 
SF of retail, including a 58,000 SF King Soopers grocery store as anchor (Forest City (2)).  As 
evidenced in the picture below, the town center includes retail on the first floor, and apartments 
on the second floors of buildings.  The 29th Avenue retail area terminates on its east end at the 
2.5 acre Founders’ Green park and open space. 
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Founders Green and the East 29th Avenue Town Center (courtesy Stapleton Denver website) 
The Town Center includes popular “quick casual” eateries such as Chipotle and Starbucks, as 
well as a variety of neighborhood shops and businesses.  This part of the development also 
includes 34,000 SF of office space, which at this time primarily includes the executive offices for 
Forest City’s Denver operations. 
 In the past, developers have often shied away from mixed-use buildings, including those 
with retail on ground floors and residential in upper floors, citing concerns over the marketability 
of the residential units to prospective buyers or renters, and complications in constructing such 
buildings.  Many skeptics have claimed, for example, that apartment renters accustomed to 
traditional apartment complexes would be unwilling to live above restaurants due to worries 
concerning noise and odors.  Forest City indicates that it has faced very few problems in 
successfully delivering a truly mixed-use product at the 29th Avenue Center.  Jim Chrisman 
indicates that the main challenges in constructing the town center involved fairly straightforward 
design and accounting issues.  For example, the company had to work with contractors and 
architects to ensure that the heating and ventilation systems for the retail and residential 
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 components were sufficiently separated to avoid problems.  It also designed apartments with 
walls that would sufficiently block noise from incompatible uses, such as restaurants or other 
retail uses.  Accounting challenges involved allocating costs to the different components of the 
mixed-use buildings.  Construction professionals usually use standard costs for apartments or 
offices, for example, in projecting budgets for projects.  Standard costs simply do not exist for 
mixed-use buildings because of their particular idiosyncrasies.  Chrisman and his team faced 
considerable difficulty in budgeting the overall cost of the 29th Avenue project to different 
product types.  These cost accounting issues make it more difficult for Forest City to price the 
residential and retail products to generate sufficient margins.  In essence, as evidenced by the 
Stapleton project and a myriad of New Urbanist projects emerging around the country, 
developers have been able to successfully deliver mixed-use buildings, but may face logistical 
and project management issues along the way. 
 Forest City officials indicated that the overall story of Stapleton’s development plan and 
the Green Book helped sell individual tenants on the 29th Avenue Town Center.  The company 
had to demonstrate that a substantial residential base, including a wide range of incomes, was 
developing in order to entice certain tenants looking for particular market niches.  Companies 
such as Borders, for example, were looking for residential growth at the site in order to justify 
investment.  While the big-box retailers at the Quebec Square development were able to rely on 
the demographics and retail market power of the surrounding neighborhoods and the under-
retailed condition of Northeast Denver, some of the more upscale retailers in the town center had 
to look more closely at demographics of incoming Stapleton residents, the quality of the 
development overall, and the residential growth ongoing.  Robb Brown indicated that the “buzz” 
surrounding the unique project, including the substantial marketing Forest City launched 
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 throughout Denver, helped justify the premiums in rents the company was charging retailers.  He 
also indicated that national retailers, with substantial cash reserves, have more wherewithal to 
invest in a higher end yet unproven project such as Stapleton, as opposed to often more cash-
strapped local merchants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Mixed-Use Building, East 29th Avenue Town Center (courtesy Stapleton Denver web site) 
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 Forest City has plans to replicate the compact, mixed-use “town center” concept of East 
29th Avenue in subsequent neighborhood retail areas in the eastern, undeveloped portions of 
Stapleton in coming years.  Meanwhile, however, the company has moved forward with 
Northfield at Stapleton, a second “lifestyle center” of largely big-box retailers north and east of I-
70 and Quebec Street.  SuperTarget, Circuit City, and the rapidly expanding Bass Pro Shops 
have just recently opened at the development, and Harkins Theaters and Macy’s plan to open 
during 2006.  Forest City describes Northfield as “a 1.2 million SF open air “power town”… 
with specialty shops, restaurants, and entertainment in a pedestrian-friendly setting.” (Forest City 
web site)  The company’s promotional language clearly tries to leverage the sustainability and 
community design aspects of the larger Stapleton development to drive interest in Northfield as a 
“neighborhood center”.  The company also touts Northfield as a destination shopping location 
serving all of the Greater Denver area. 
 
 
Artists’ Rendering of Northfield retail center (courtesy Stapleton Denver web site) 
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 Because Northfield is just now coming on line, little information is available concerning 
the performance of the center in the marketplace.  The power center does, of course, represent 
another move by Forest City away from the neighborhood “town center” concept evidenced on 
East 29th Avenue, and a development play to capture retail dollars from larger footprints and a 
larger slice of the metro Denver market.  Time will tell whether the lifestyle center nature of 
Northfield will help enhance the marketability of Stapleton as a unique infill community. 
 
Office Development at Stapleton 
 Forest City’s development plan for Stapleton calls for a total of 10 million SF of office 
space over the next few decades.  This includes space along I-70 for the new Denver Bio Science 
Center at Stapleton, the 5-story Town Square Building in vicinity of the East 29th Avenue Town 
Center, and the 12-story One Tower Center.  The Bio Science Center includes 200 acres 
bordering I-70 offered to prospective users on a build-to-suit basis, and the Company’s 
University, Bioscience, and Technology Group offers design, development, and operation 
services to prospective bio science users.  The aforementioned office suites on the second and 
third floors of the 29th Avenue Town Center include 34,000 SF of space and opened in 
November 2003.  The facilities overlook the “Main Street” shopping area of Stapleton and cater 
directly to smaller users.  In addition, the company has signed deals for an additional 65,000 SF 
of medical office space in two new buildings at Stapleton (Montgomery).  Forest City plans 
168,000 SF of space in the Town Square Building, which will overlook the Founders’ Green 
park at the East 29th Avenue Town Center.  The One Tower Center will include 300,000 SF of 
high-rise space, and feature views of the Front Range and Downtown Denver. 
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  To date, Forest City’s development of office and industrial space at Stapleton has lagged 
considerably behind the strength of the retail and residential components.  Most of the larger 
office buildings remain on the drawing board, and the only substantive office leasing has 
occurred in the small office space within the East 29th Avenue Town Center, and with regard to 
65,000 SF of medical office space.  The overall weakness of the metro Denver office market 
since Forest City’s assumption of the project has tremendously impacted absorption.  The area 
office market had grown a great deal during the 1990s, but activity declined dramatically with 
the fall of the region’s high-tech economy during the “dot-com bust” of 2001, just as the 
company began development at Stapleton.  Employment levels in the metropolitan area remained 
flat during 2001 and decreased by around 40,000 people in 2002 and 20,000 in 2003 
(Transwestern).  Only in the last few years has the office market begun to recover along the 
Front Range, giving hope to Forest City’s office program.  Vacancy rates in the 
Northeast/Aurora subsector of the office market peaked at 16.6 percent in 2003 and have fallen 
to 15.3 percent in 2004 and 14.6 percent as of December 2005.  However, net absorption in all of 
metro Denver for 2005 totaled about 1.9 million SF, meaning that even if Stapleton were to 
capture a mere quarter of new absorption in a given year, Forest City will not fill its office 
program for over 20 years (ibid).  While the significant size of the Stapleton parcels may be best 
suited to large tenants, Grubb and Ellis reported that office activity during the recovery of 2005 
has largely involved smaller or mid-size tenants increasing their footprints in the Denver market 
(Grubb).  Voter approval of significant public monies for completion of the $4.7 million 
FasTracks mass transit plan for metro Denver in the fall of 2004 (Hudson), which will include a 
major light rail line running from Downtown, along Stapleton’s northern edge on Smith Road, 
and on to DIA, could spark increased interest in office parcels at Stapleton as the entire Denver 
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 market aggressively moves forward and embraces the transit-oriented development (“TOD”) 
idea.  Developers have planned several TODs along other lines, including near the Denver Tech 
Center, and the presence of the light rail line at Stapleton could propel office growth in the 
future. 
 While Stapleton enjoys a good location in the metro area, nearby projects cloud its 
competitive position.  Forest City will lead the redevelopment of the old Fitzsimons Medical 
Center property, adjacent to Stapleton to the east in Aurora, and plans three to four million 
additional SF of office space, primarily targeting biotech uses, at the property.  Jim Chrisman 
indicates that Forest City will focus on marketing Fitzsimons to research and development 
(“R&D”) firms, and as a result target companies in the manufacturing and distribution arenas for 
the Stapleton areas.  While the Fitzsimons project is a welcome development for Forest City, it 
further clouds and crowds the general office market along I-70 east of Downtown.  In addition, 
Stapleton will face added competition in coming years from the development of HighPoint, an 
1,800-acre mixed use community planned by Landmark Properties on the empty plains between 
I-70 and DIA east of Denver that promises 10 million SF of office and R&D space (Landmark).  
In addition, of course, Stapleton faces continued pressure for office tenants from the Denver 
Tech Center along I-25, several high-tech oriented office complexes along the Boulder Turnpike 
(US 36) in the Bloomfield area just northwest of Denver, and from office ventures in the 
resurgent Central Business District. 
 While Forest City remains committed to carrying out its plans for 10 million of office 
space development at the airport site, the lack of activity in this sector may impact other parts of 
the project in the future and force the company to change its initial development plan.  For 
example, the lack of office growth is causing problems in planning for future neighborhood town 
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 center mixed-use developments in other areas of Stapleton, to the east of the initial East 29th 
Avenue effort.  Because the mixed-use efforts rely on retail on ground floors with office uses on 
higher levels, continued weakness in the office sector may delay plans for future neighborhood 
centers or lead Forest City to change the development plan to reduce office market exposure in 
these mixed-use buildings.  While Forest City is retaining its original build-out projections, Steve 
Turner, Stapleton project manager for the City of Denver, wonders “how long can they hold?  I 
mean, at some point if the market doesn’t come back in the next five to ten years, I would 
suspect that they would come to us and say they may need to do something else, maybe more 
residential.”  (Montgomery)  Moving significantly away from the office sector, of course, would 
diminish the original vision of Stapleton in the Green Book as a well-rounded development 
emphasizing economic development and employment opportunities for the city and its residents.  
Losing a large portion of the office component could reduce Stapleton to a very large residential 
and commercial infill parcel in the city and create less long term value for the city as an income 
and employment generator, as the plan promised. 
 While hindsight, as the saying goes, is always perfect, many observers have pointed to 
the aforementioned delays in launching the Stapleton project between 1995 and 2000 as a key 
source of Forest City’s current office development shortfall.  While the city, the SDC, and other 
parties hammered out mechanisms to fund infrastructure at the airport, clean the property, and to 
select a master developer during that time, the Stapleton effort was missing out on one of the 
largest office market booms witnessed in modern Denver history.  The net absorption of office 
properties in the metro area per year steadily increased from two million SF in 1997 to around 
six million SF in 2000, and office vacancy rates during this period ranged between 6 percent and 
9 percent (Transwestern).  Many critics, particularly those in the real estate development 
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 community who were eager to land the Stapleton deal, complain that the city’s bureaucratic 
delays substantially harmed Stapleton’s office program over the long term.  While Forest City 
now does have the basic framework of a high quality mixed-use infill project in place, with a 
substantial residential and commercial presence in place to serve potential employees and their 
companies, the firm is now playing catch-up in creating the office component at Stapleton. 
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 Key Lessons / Takeaways from the Stapleton Redevelopment 
 
 The Stapleton redevelopment remains one of the largest infill projects in U.S. history, and 
certainly the largest reuse of a major airport in American history.  Every stage of the project, 
from initial citizen planning efforts during the late 1980s and early 1990s to Forest City’s current 
efforts to continue retail and residential success while jumpstarting office and industrial 
development activity, has provided valuable lessons for urban planners, real estate developers, 
and other stakeholders considering other large-scale infill projects around the country.  Many of 
the takeaways are lessons common to a wide variety of infill projects, while other lessons relate 
mainly to the unique issues faced by “mega-projects” such as Stapleton. 
 
• The city involved the Denver community to a great extent in the formation of the Green 
Book early on in the development process.  This helped create greater “buy-in” from 
community members in the vision of Stapleton Airport’s future use.  By including fairly 
detailed site analyses and design attributes in the Green Book, the city avoided lengthy 
public approval processes for the project later on.  Plans for Stapleton were on the books 
in the city’s comprehensive plans by the time officials began soliciting developer interest.  
Forest City, or any other developer, would have faced substantial entitlement risk had the 
Green Book not been in place.  Stapleton represents a good example of how planners can 
work with stakeholders from various sectors, including business, neighborhood members, 
school officials, environmentalists, and others, to envision development for infill 
properties.  Planners should look to the Green Book as an outstanding example of how to 
integrate a variety of community concerns into a successful planning document for later 
use. 
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• While the Green Book exercise of the early 1990s was a good example of how to carry 
out initial efforts in moving infill development forward, the city and its partners stumbled 
between 1995 and 1999 in carrying out the Green Book vision.  The Stapleton effort 
reveals that cities must avoid political quagmires in determining who has responsibility 
for various aspects of a given development.  The SDC played the role of developer during 
this time, but did not have buy-in from all parties, and did not move efficiently in 
developing formal development agreements.  Cities contemplating significant infill or 
reuse efforts should carefully set up parameters of responsibility for various agencies and 
partners upfront, before political squabbling wastes valuable time.  During the mid to late 
1990s, the Stapleton effort largely drifted in bureaucratic morass, and the city could have 
more quickly capitalized on the solid economy present during this time by moving more 
efficiently to move development forward. 
 
• Once Denver moved beyond its bureaucratic squabbles over how to proceed with the 
Green Book vision, it proved that strong leadership and choosing a good developer are 
key to infill efforts.  Dick Anderson is a veteran of the Denver real estate scene and had 
the political gravitas and power in the community to end a great deal of the political 
wrangling and put procedures in place to move forward with development from the 
private sector.  Selecting Forest City was a key step as well.  The company had a solid 
track record of completing quality, New Urbanist infill projects elsewhere, and company 
officials worked very hard to demonstrate that it would follow the visions of the Green 
Book and work well with community officials and local residents.  Denver’s experience 
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 proves that a city should not choose developers lightly.  While it is possible that another 
developer could have performed as well or better than Forest City has, the selection of the 
Ohio developer brought proven experience in mixed-use infill work to the table. 
 
• For its part, Forest City’s efforts in assembling its team provide a good example to other 
infill developers.  The company selected several veterans of other Denver infill efforts to 
lead Stapleton, as well as individuals who were familiar and involved with the Green 
Book planning.  Hank Baker, the most prominent official at Forest City Stapleton, has 
years of experience from developing Irvine, California, and has worked to maintain 
strong relations with Denver constituents and the real estate community. 
 
• Infill developments often involve creative public/private arrangements, and the 
development agreement and the TIF structure between Forest City and Denver provides a 
good example of such collaboration.  The development provided a mechanism whereby 
Forest City could rationally move forward with the significant infrastructure involved at 
the airport while assuming risk for this effort.  The TIF structure provided a way for 
Forest City to pay for infrastructure.  Importantly, however, the agreement provided for 
the city to gain a greater share of the proceeds of retail development, in the form of taxes, 
over time.  This move helped sell the TIF concept to various community constituencies. 
 
• From Forest City’s perspective, the established development plan for Stapleton and the 
takedown schedule allowed it to move forward with the project.  The Green Book 
provided a framework it could use to drive homebuilder and tenant interest and, of 
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 course, simplified approval processes with the city for individual parts of the project.  
The takedown schedule for land allowed Forest City to take on acreage as needed, on a 
“just in time” basis.  While the schedule provided for the developer to move forward with 
Stapleton on a set schedule, it did not force the company to take on the entire parcel at 
once.  Forcing a developer to acquire the whole parcel at one time would have strained 
the developer more financially and could have broken the deal.  The land acquisition 
structure of the Stapleton deal provides a solid example for other infill projects 
nationwide. 
 
• At Quebec Square, Forest City was able to produce the necessary tax revenues to drive 
development elsewhere in the project.  This provides an example of how other infill 
developers may use retail or other uses to drive residential and infrastructure components 
in their deals.  From the standpoint of the city and critics of big-box retail, Quebec Square 
provides several lessons.  While many cities have established minimum parking ratios for 
retail, for example, and have expressed a willingness to allow New Urbanist developers 
to modify these codes, the strong market power of anchor tenants such as Wal-Mart and 
their insistence on providing higher ratios for parking may mean that cities should 
consider establishing maximum parking ratios for infill properties.  Doing so may lead 
developers to use space more efficiently and employ more creative urban design 
techniques in infill areas in order to create higher quality urban developments.  The city’s 
requirement that Quebec Square develop on a grid pattern, to allow for later reuse or 
redevelopment of the retail parcels, shows how cities can plan ahead for later 
development and use various techniques to influence site planning requirements. 
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• Forest City’s experience at the East 29th Avenue Town Center proves that truly mixed-
use retail centers can be viable in an infill environment.  The company has successfully 
integrated retail, office, and residential components at the site, and has created a more 
walkable neighborhood for Stapleton residents, in keeping with the visions of the Green 
Book. 
 
• Finally, the lackluster performance of Stapleton’s office component provides two key 
lessons for infill developers and planners.  First, delays in moving forward with a project 
may come back to haunt infill efforts.  While city officials and other stakeholders 
dithered over how to proceed with Stapleton during the late 1990s, they were missing one 
of the largest booms in the office market in Denver history.  By the time Stapleton came 
on line, the office market had crashed.  While the office sector may blossom in coming 
years at Stapleton, the community missed a valuable opportunity during the late 1990s.  
Secondly, Stapleton’s office track record demonstrates that infill projects may need to 
consider changes in development programs over time.  If the office sector does not 
recover quickly during the next several years, Forest City may need to consider changing 
the office parcels to residential or commercial uses.  This experience demonstrates that 
infill planners and developers must remain flexible with changing market dynamics. 
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 Conclusion 
 
 While the Stapleton redevelopment effort encountered some rough patches along the 
way, it has largely provided a good example of how to carry out large infill redevelopments in 
major U.S. cities.  The Green Book, in particular, demonstrates how planners can create good 
plans that can effectively guide future development and create successful projects.  Denver’s 
relationship with Forest City shows how the public and private sector can work effectively to 
launch complicated brownfield projects.  Forest City itself is an example of how development 
firms can have it both ways.  The company has created a successful infill project that largely 
satisfies the local community, creates well-designed neighborhoods for the future, and creates 
substantial returns for the private sector.  While Stapleton provides some examples of how infill 
projects can encounter problems, it today largely stands as a good example of how the Denver 
community has successfully rebuilt its urban core over the last decade.  Along with the Lowry 
redevelopment, ventures in the Platte Valley and LoDo, and passage of the FasTracks transit plan 
and planned TODs throughout the region, Stapleton provides another example of how infill 
redevelopment has worked well in the “Queen City of the Plains”. 
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